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CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ROT 
JACK M. BALKIN 
No one could accuse Donald Trump’s presidency of being boring.  The 
first hundred days have careened wildly through scandals, revelations, out-
rages, and fracturing of political norms.  Because Donald Trump is very 
unpopular, and because he regularly does things that his opponents consider 
outrageous, his critics have begun to describe his actions as creating or pre-
cipitating a “constitutional crisis,” especially following his first executive 
order limiting entry into the United States,1 and again after his firing of FBI 
director James Comey.2 
In 2009, Sandy Levinson and I wrote an article about constitutional 
crises.3  We argued that the term is overused; people apply it to many situa-
tions that are worrisome but that are not really constitutional crises at all.  In 
this Essay, I offer a brief explanation of the term and why it is so likely to 
be misused.  I also introduce a second idea, “constitutional rot,” and explain 
how it relates to Levinson’s and my theory of constitutional crisis.  Many 
claims of constitutional crisis about Trump’s presidency, I argue, reflect a 
growing recognition of the constitutional rot in our nation’s political institu-
tions. 
I.  WHAT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS? 
A constitutional crisis occurs when there is a serious danger that the 
Constitution is about to fail at its central task.  The central task of constitu-
tions is to keep disagreement within the boundaries of ordinary politics ra-
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 1.  See, e.g., Jessica Schulberg & Sam Levine, Trump Inches the U.S. Closer to Constitu-
tional Crisis, HUFFPOST (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-
constitutional-crisis-judge-robart_us_58964292e4b09bd304bba74f (quoting Senator Patrick 
Leahy’s statement that President Trump “seems intent on precipitating a constitutional crisis”).  
 2.  See, e.g., David Cole, Trump’s Constitutional Crisis, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10, 2017), 
http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/05/10/trumps-constitutional-crisis-james-comey/ (“This is a 
constitutional crisis.”); Alexandra Wilts, Comey Fired: America Is Witnessing a Constitutional 
Crisis, Says Leading Democrat, INDEPENDENT (May 10, 2017), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/james-comey-fired-donald-trump-
constitutional-crisis-fbi-director-russian-investigation-latest-news-a7727341.html (quoting Repre-
sentative Keith Ellison’s remark that “[w]e are witnessing a constitutional crisis unfold before our 
very eyes”).  
 3.  Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 707 
(2009). 
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ther than breaking down into anarchy, violence, or civil war.4  To be sure, 
constitutions are also valuable because they protect civil liberties and divide 
and restrain power; but their first job is to keep the peace and make people 
struggle with each other within politics rather than outside of it. 
Constitutional crises come in three types.  In Type One crises, politi-
cians (or military officials) publicly announce that they won’t obey the 
Constitution.5  In our system of government, government officials are sup-
posed to obey judicial orders specifically directed to them.  (This is true 
even if they believe that the judge has interpreted the law incorrectly.)  
Therefore defying a direct judicial order would also be tantamount to pre-
cipitating a constitutional crisis.  When government officials (or the mili-
tary) publicly announce that they will no longer play by the rules of the 
Constitution, the Constitution has failed.  Constitutional crises of this type 
are very rare in American history. 
Second, the Constitution might fail because it keeps political actors 
from preventing a looming disaster.6  We call these Type Two Crises.7  
These situations are even rarer because political actors (and the courts) usu-
ally conclude that the Constitution allows them to escape disaster.8 
Third, a constitution might fail because lots of people refuse to obey 
it—there are riots in the streets, states secede from the Union, the army re-
fuses to obey civilian control, and so on.9  Type Three crises involve “situa-
tions where publicly articulated disagreements about the Constitution lead 
political actors to engage in extraordinary forms of protest beyond mere le-
gal disagreements and political protests: people take to the streets, armies 
mobilize, and brute force is used or threatened in order to prevail.”10 
When people are upset at what government officials have done, they 
often call these actions constitutional crises.  However, most of these situa-
tions aren’t really constitutional crises, because there is no real danger that 
the Constitution is about to break down.  The vast majority of uses of the 
term “constitutional crisis” are hyperbole.11 
                                                          
 4.  Id. at 711, 714–15. 
 5.  Id. at 714, 721–29 (describing Type One crises). 
 6.  Id. at 714. 
 7.  Id. at 729–38 (describing Type Two crises). 
 8.  Id. at 729–31 (giving the example of President Abraham Lincoln taking a different view 
of the power to respond to rebellion than his predecessor, President James Buchanan). 
 9.  Id. at 714, 738–46 (describing Type Three crises). 
 10.  Id. at 714. 
 11.  Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. 
REV. 579, 590 (2008) (“[M]any so-called ‘constitutional crises’ are not real crises at all, but rather 
heated disagreements about the Constitution in which people fear (whether reasonably or unrea-
sonably) that the system will spin out of control . . . .”). 
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Sometimes when people call something a constitutional crisis, they re-
ally mean that there is a heated dispute about the best interpretation of the 
law or the Constitution, and that their political opponents are interpreting 
the law or the Constitution in the wrong way.  That in itself, however, is not 
a constitutional crisis, because disputes about the best interpretation of the 
law and of the Constitution are a normal feature of American politics.  
Many, but not all, of those disputes are eventually settled in the courts.  
Others are settled through politics.  Settlement of serious disputes through 
the courts or politics is not a constitutional crisis.  On the contrary, it is how 
a constitution is supposed to work.12 
Sometimes what people call constitutional crises are really what Mark 
Tushnet has called “constitutional hardball.”13  Constitutional hardball oc-
curs when political actors stretch or defy political conventions that were 
previously considered unspoken rules of fair play in politics but were not 
clearly legally required.14  People who engage in hardball tactics deliberate-
ly violate old norms in order to create new ones and gain a political ad-
vantage.15  This often causes outrage and leads to reprisals in politics.  The 
Republican-controlled Senate’s refusal to hold a hearing for anyone Presi-
dent Obama nominated to the Supreme Court in his last year in office was 
an example of constitutional hardball.16  The Republican strategy violated 
what Democrats believed were unspoken norms of political fair play, and it 
will likely shape how Democrats behave in the future.  What happened was 
not, however, a constitutional crisis. 
A more accurate use of the term “constitutional crisis” involves situa-
tions in which people reasonably fear that the Constitution will fail in one 
of the three ways I’ve just described, even though the breaking point hasn’t 
                                                          
 12.  Levinson & Balkin, supra note 3, at 714 (“Disagreement and conflict are natural features 
of politics.  The goal of constitutions is to manage them within acceptable boundaries.”). 
 13.  Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523 (2004). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See id. (“[P]ractitioners [of constitutional hardball] see themselves as playing for keeps in 
a special kind of way; they believe the stakes of the political controversy their actions provoke are 
quite high . . . .”). 
 16.  Michael Dorf, Hardball, Structural Forces, Ineptitude, and Chaos on the Road to Trump 
and Beyond, DORF ON L. (Nov. 15, 2016, 11:34 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2016/11/hardball-structural-forces-ineptitude.html (offering “the Re-
publican Senate’s successful intransigence in denying Judge Merrick Garland confirmation hear-
ings or a vote” as an example of constitutional hardball); Paul Rosenberg, The Year Democracy 
Broke—and How We Got Here, SALON (Nov. 8, 2016, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2016/11/08/the-year-democracy-broke-and-how-we-got-here/ (“[W]hen 
Republican senators staunchly refused to let President Barack Obama appoint a new justice to the 
Supreme Court . . . [t]his was an example of . . . ‘constitutional hardball’ . . . .”). 
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yet occurred.  A constitution that is on the brink of failure is a constitution 
in crisis.17 
If President Richard Nixon had refused to obey the Supreme Court’s 
order to surrender the Watergate tapes in 1974, he would have precipitated 
a constitutional crisis of the first type.18  People feared that Nixon wouldn’t 
obey, and so one could say that this was a moment of constitutional crisis.  
Ultimately, however, he did obey the judicial order, and the potential crisis 
was averted. 
Probably the most important constitutional crisis in the nation’s history 
was the secession of the southern states and the resulting Civil War.  This 
was a crisis of the first type and the third type.19  Politicians and military of-
ficials openly stated that they would refuse to play by the rules of the Con-
stitution; states seceded from the Union, and then they resisted through vio-
lence.  That constitutional crisis resulted in enormous bloodshed and 
suffering, and required the Constitution to be reconstructed with three new 
amendments. 
A constitutional crisis is a very serious thing, because if we were in the 
middle of a genuine constitutional crisis, there would be a real and serious 
danger that the Constitution would fail at its central task.  But, as noted 
above, most things that people call constitutional crises don’t involve seri-
ous threats of constitutional failure.  In general, one should not confuse 
heated constitutional disputes with constitutional crises.  Similarly, one 
should not confuse political crises—in which people struggle for power 
within the limits of the Constitution—with constitutional crises, in which 
the Constitution itself fails or is on the verge of failing. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL ROT 
We should distinguish constitutional crises from another, related phe-
nomenon, which we might call “constitutional rot.”20  Constitutional crisis 
could, in theory, happen to any constitution; constitutional rot is a specific 
malady of constitutions of representative democracies—that is, republics.  
Constitutional crisis occurs during relatively brief periods of time; constitu-
                                                          
 17.  See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 3, at 745 (“People may have regarded Watergate, the 
2000 election, and the Steel Seizure Case as crises not because they were crises in the sense we 
describe, but because they feared that they would become that sort of crisis.”). 
 18.  Id. at 742 (arguing that failure to comply with an order from the Supreme Court would 
have precipitated a Type One crisis). 
 19.  Id. at 740 (noting that secession was a Type Three crisis).  Because the rebel states pub-
licly stated that they were no longer bound by the 1787 Constitution, it was also a Type One crisis. 
 20.  Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?: AUTHORITARIANISM IN 
AMERICA 19 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2992961. 
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tional rot is a degradation of constitutional norms that may operate over 
long periods of time. 
What is constitutional rot?  Democratic constitutions depend on more 
than obedience to law.  They depend on well-functioning institutions that 
balance and check power and ambition.  They depend on the public’s trust 
that government officials will exercise power in the public interest and not 
for their own personal benefit or for the benefit of private interests and cro-
nies.  Democracies also depend on forbearance on the part of public offi-
cials in their assertions of power and obedience to norms of fair political 
competition.  These norms prevent ambitious politicians from overreaching, 
entrenching themselves and their ideological allies, and undermining public 
trust.  These norms help to promote cooperation between political oppo-
nents and factions even when they disagree strongly about how to govern 
the country.  Finally, these norms prevent politicians from privileging short-
term political gains over long-term injuries to the health of the constitution-
al system. 
When politicians disregard norms of fair political competition, under-
mine public trust, and repeatedly overreach by using constitutional hardball 
to rig the system in their favor and keep themselves (or their allies) in pow-
er, they cause the system of democratic (and republican) constitutionalism 
to decay.  This is an example of constitutional rot. 
More generally, constitutional rot is a process of decay in the features 
of our system of government that maintain it as a healthy democratic repub-
lic.21  As constitutional rot occurs, our system becomes simultaneously less 
democratic and less republican.  The political system becomes less demo-
cratic because the power of the state becomes less responsive to popular 
opinion and popular will.  The political system becomes less republican be-
cause representatives are no longer devoted to promoting the public good; 
instead, they seek to maintain themselves in power and please a relatively 
small set of powerful individuals and groups.  When this happens, the re-
publican system of representation fails—even if the system remains formal-
ly representative in the sense that we still have elections—and the result is 
oligarchy.22 
Governments become oligarchical when political leaders become in-
creasingly beholden to relatively small groups of backers who keep them in 
power.  Because members of the public feel that their leaders are not re-
sponsive to them—and indeed, feel abandoned by the very people who are 
supposed to serve their interests—they lose faith in the political system.23 
                                                          
 21.  Id. at 19–20. 
 22.  Id. at 20–21. 
 23.  Id. at 21. 
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When constitutional rot becomes advanced, and the public’s trust in 
government is thoroughly undermined, people turn to demagogues, who 
flatter the public, and who stoke division, anger and resentment.24  Dema-
gogues promise that they will restore lost glories and make everything right 
again.  They divert the public’s attention to enemies and scapegoats within 
and without the republic.  They divide the public in order to conquer it.  
They play on people’s fears of loss of status.  They use divisive rhetoric to 
distract attention, maintain a loyal set of supporters, and keep themselves in 
power.  There are always potential demagogues in a republic, but healthy 
republics restrain their emergence and ascension.  When demagogues man-
age to take power and lead the nation, however, constitutional rot has be-
come serious indeed. 
Four factors may hasten constitutional rot.25  The first factor is loss of 
trust, both in government and in one’s fellow citizens.26  The second factor 
is polarization, which causes members of the public to regard their fellow 
citizens as implacable enemies rather than members of a common enter-
prise; it also leads members of the public to waste their attention and ener-
gies on symbolic conflicts and zero-sum conflicts over social status.27 
A third factor is increasing economic inequality, which creates anger 
and resentment, and leads the public to look for scapegoats and enemies 
who are the cause of its misfortunes.28  The fourth factor is policy disasters, 
a term coined by Stephen Griffin.29  Policy disasters are serious failures in 
decisionmaking by the public’s representatives, which cause the public to 
lose faith in government.  Examples of policy disasters in recent American 
history include the Iraq War and the 2008 financial crisis.30  Policy disasters 
lead people to feel that their leaders are incompetent, untrustworthy, and 
unrepresentative.  People increasingly feel that they have been abandoned 
by their leaders, who care only for themselves and not for the public they 
represent. 
These four factors often exacerbate each other.31  Rising economic in-
equality can increase polarization.  Polarization diverts public attention to 
symbolic conflicts and zero-sum conflicts over status; this allows powerful 
interests to pursue policies that enhance inequality and entrench oligarchy.  
                                                          
 24.  Id.  
 25.  Id. at 22 (describing the “Four Horsemen of Constitutional Rot”). 
 26.  Id. at 22, 26–27. 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. at 22–23. 
 29.  Id. at 22; STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, BROKEN TRUST: DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 20–21 (2015) (defining policy disasters as “government outcomes that 
are in no one’s interests”). 
 30.  GRIFFIN, supra note 29, at 20–21; Balkin, supra note 20, at 22. 
 31.  Balkin, supra note 20, at 22–23. 
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Increasing economic inequality and lack of responsiveness to the public’s 
needs, in turn, undermine public confidence in the system and faith in one’s 
fellow citizens, which may increase polarization.  Polarization and oligar-
chy insulate representatives from the public, produce overconfidence, and 
insulate decisionmakers from criticism, which leads to policy disasters.  
Policy disasters, in turn, undermine trust in government, and so on.32 
The idea of constitutional rot is very old.  The political theory of re-
publicanism familiar to the Constitution’s founders asserted that republics 
were delicate institutions that were always susceptible to decay and corrup-
tion over time.33  Time was the great enemy of republics, because ever-
changing circumstances, and the driving force of people’s ambitions and 
desire for power would open the door to—if not encourage—multiple forms 
of institutional corruption.34  In modern democratic republics, this institu-
tional corruption is constitutional rot. 
Constitutional rot creates two serious risks to democratic politics.  
First, by playing too much hardball, enhancing political polarization, de-
monizing their opposition, and attempting to crush those who stand in their 
way, political actors risk increasing and widening cycles of retribution from 
their opponents.  This may lead to deadlock and a political system that is 
increasingly unable to govern effectively.  This, in turn, can cause even 
greater loss of confidence in government, distrust, and polarization, has-
tening constitutional rot. 
Second, undermining or destroying norms of political fair play and us-
ing hardball tactics to preempt political competition may produce a gradual 
descent into authoritarian or autocratic politics.35  Such states may preserve 
                                                          
 32.  Id. 
 33. See PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 210 
(1997) (explaining that in the republican tradition corruption occurs when people “make their de-
cisions by reference not to considerations of the common good but rather to more sectional or pri-
vate concerns”); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 527 (1975) (“Virtue can develop only in 
time, but is always threatened with corruption by time.”); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM 
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 105 (1991) (“Precisely because republics required civic virtue 
and disinterestedness among their citizens, they were very fragile polities, extremely liable to cor-
ruption.”). 
 34.  PETTIT, supra note 33, at 210–11 (arguing that the basic problem of republics is to pro-
mote resilience and stability in the face of continual sources of temptation and corruption); Jack 
M. Balkin, Republicanism and the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1427, 1444 
(2016) (“[T]ime is the great enemy of republics, because as time goes on and circumstances 
change, corruption finds ever-new ways of entering the system, weakening the institutions and 
practices that ensure republican government.”). 
 35.  See Nancy Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 5 (2016) (explaining 
democratic backsliding as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institu-
tions that sustain an existing democracy”).  “Competitive authoritarianism” is another way of de-
scribing the general phenomenon.  See STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE 
AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 5 (2010) (defining competitive 
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the empty form of representative democracy—they may have written con-
stitutions and regular elections; and they may adhere for the most part to the 
rule of law formalities.  But power is increasingly concentrated and unac-
countable; the press, civil society, political opponents, civil servants, and 
the judiciary no longer serve as independent checks on the power of the 
people in charge.  Indeed, political leaders may systematically seek to 
weaken or co-opt each of these possible sources of opposition. 
These features of constitutional rot are likely to lead to increasing cor-
ruption, overreaching, and suppression of basic liberties.  Regimes that slide 
into autocracy or authoritarianism may not suffer constitutional crises to the 
extent that they remain politically stable and successfully avoid civil unrest 
or civil war, but they have failed as democratic constitutional systems. In-
creasingly they are democracies in name only. 
Obviously, these two risks—deadlock and descent into autocracy—are 
related.  A system that has become so deadlocked that politics seems futile 
may lead to the election of demagogues and authoritarian-minded politi-
cians who undermine democratic norms and lead a nation toward autocracy. 
What is the relationship between constitutional crisis and constitution-
al rot?  The two phenomena are not identical.  As noted above, the question 
of constitutional crisis concerns whether the constitutional system can per-
form its central function of making politics possible—keeping struggles for 
power within politics and preventing violence, insurrection, and civil war.  
The three types of constitutional crises listed above can occur in many dif-
ferent kinds of systems, whether democratic or not.  Constitutional rot, by 
contrast, is a feature of constitutional democracies and republics—it con-
cerns how these systems degrade into deadlock and despair on the one 
hand, or into authoritarianism and autocracy on the other. 
There is another important distinction.  The idea of “crisis” refers to a 
crucial moment in time—usually rather brief in duration—in which the 
constitutional system will adequately respond to a challenge, be under-
mined, or be successfully reconstituted.  Constitutional rot, by contrast, is 
often a long and slow process of change and debilitation, which may be the 
work of many hands over many years.  Crisis seems to come upon us sud-
denly—it focuses everyone’s attention on the spectacle.  Rot develops slow-
ly and gradually and may be imperceptible in its earliest stages; sometimes 
features of constitutional rot are obvious, but sometimes they operate quiet-
ly in the background. 
                                                          
authoritarian regimes as “civil regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist . . . but in 
which incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage”).  Competitive au-
thoritarianism applies to regimes that never fully transitioned to democracy, as well as to fully 
democratic regimes in which democracy gradually decays into autocracy or authoritarianism.  
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Even so, the two phenomena are connected.  Continued constitutional 
rot in a democratic system may be the harbinger of a constitutional crisis 
years later.  Stephen Griffin has argued that the most important source of 
constitutional dysfunction in the United States is increasing loss of public 
trust among citizens.36  This loss of trust did not occur overnight; it is the 
result of decades of fateful decisions by political actors seeking short-term 
political success, stoking political polarization to win elections, and playing 
political hardball to lock in greater power and reduced accountability.  Grif-
fin regards this as a sort of “slow-motion” constitutional crisis.37  I would 
say that it is a description of constitutional rot. 
Constitutional rot in a democracy need not always lead to constitution-
al crisis.  It might simply lead to a less just and less democratic system of 
government.  This is what happens when a democracy effectively becomes 
an oligarchy, or when a political system slides into autocracy.  Neverthe-
less, constitutional rot, if unchecked, can lead to a constitutional crisis, just 
as placing increasing weight on a rotten tree branch can eventually cause it 
to snap.  Indeed, constitutional rot can lead to any one of the three types of 
constitutional crisis that Levinson and I described. 
Politicians may publicly reject constitutional obligations (Type One).  
The system may suffer severe crises of governance in which the state is un-
able to perform basic functions (Type Two).  Finally, loss of public trust, 
combined with the rise of political opportunists and demagogues who stoke 
anger and resentment in their followers (or in their opponents), may pro-
duce cycles of political violence, or even insurrection (Type Three). 
Constitutional rot, in other words, can eventually cause a democratic 
constitution to fail both as a democratic constitution—because the system 
degenerates into an oligarchy or autocracy; and as a democratic constitu-
tion—because the constitution no longer can keep political disagreement 
within the bounds of law and peaceful political dispute. 
III.  ARE WE IN A PERIOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS? 
We are not currently in a period of constitutional crisis.  But for some 
time we have been in a period of increasing constitutional rot.  The election 
of a demagogue like Trump is evidence that our institutions have decayed, 
and judging by his presidential campaign and his first several months in of-
fice, Trump promises to accelerate the corruption. 
When people talk about constitutional crisis in the Trump Administra-
tion, they might point to the executive orders on immigration that began 
Trump’s presidency or the decision to fire FBI director James Comey. 
                                                          
 36.  GRIFFIN, supra note 29, at 31, 38–39. 
 37.  Personal communication with author, March 22, 2017. 
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Trump’s first two executive orders on immigration were very unjust, 
and there are plausible arguments that both versions were unconstitution-
al.38  But the orders did not precipitate a constitutional crisis.  The courts 
often find that the Executive Branch of the United States government has 
violated the law or the Constitution, but that doesn’t make each of these sit-
uations a constitutional crisis. 
On the other hand, if President Trump ordered executive branch offi-
cials to defy judicial orders, and they did so, not merely in isolated instanc-
es out of confusion, but deliberately and consistently, that could precipitate 
a constitutional crisis.  Isolated acts of recalcitrance by a few low-level 
DHS officials, however, do not constitute a genuine constitutional crisis.  
On the other hand, if President Trump announced that he would not follow 
the Constitution, if he arrested members of the Supreme Court, or if he de-
fied a direct judicial order, that would mark a constitutional crisis. 
Similarly, Trump’s firing of James Comey was not in itself a constitu-
tional crisis, because the President legally has the authority to fire the FBI 
Director.39  It happened once before, when Bill Clinton fired Director Wil-
liam Sessions because of ethics violations.  Comey’s firing did not consti-
tute a constitutional crisis.  Trump did not assert, for example, that he was 
deliberately acting outside the Constitution.  Rather, Comey’s firing is a 
symptom of constitutional rot, as I will explain momentarily. 
As Sandy Levinson and I pointed out in our original 2009 article on 
constitutional crises, American politicians almost never announce that they 
will go outside the Constitution or the law.  Instead, they argue that they are 
                                                          
 38.  Federal courts issued injunctions against the two executive orders, which the Supreme 
Court modified pending a hearing on the merits.  These orders expired before the Court could hold 
a hearing. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1166 (9th Cir. 2017) (upholding preliminary in-
junction against first executive order); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, No. TOC-17-
0361, 2017 WL 1018235, at *18 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2017), aff’d, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. 
granted 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (upholding preliminary injunction against second executive order), 
vacated, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10,  2017)(vacating and remanding after order 
expired); Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 1167383, at *9 (D. Haw. Mar. 
29, 2017), aff’d, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017), cert granted sub nom. Trump v. Int’l Refugee As-
sistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017)(upholding preliminary injunction against second execu-
tive order), vacated, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10,  2017)(vacating and remanding 
after order expired).  Trump subsequently issued a third executive order, which is currently being 
litigated. 
 39.  See, e.g., Memorandum on the Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the Term of the 
FBI Director, Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assisstant Attorney Gen., to Office of Legal 
Counsel (June 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/06/31/fbi-
director-term_0.pdf (“[T]he FBI Director is removable at the will of the President . . . .  No statute 
purports to restrict the President’s power to remove the Director.”); Robert Chesney, Background-
er: The Power to Appoint & Remove the FBI Director, LAWFARE (May 10, 2017, 11:55 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/backgrounder-power-appoint-remove-fbi-director (“Congress at no 
point has attempted to constrain the president’s removal power.”). 
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complying with the law based on their interpretation of it.40  One might ob-
ject that this allows politicians to violate the Constitution if they just lie 
about their motivations or if their legal positions are objectively unreasona-
ble.  But there is a reason why forcing politicians to state their positions in 
terms of legality and constitutionality is important to constitutional gov-
ernment.  This means that they are still publicly adhering to a political norm 
that everyone must obey the law and the Constitution.  When politicians 
obey this norm, it drives controversies back into the courts or into ordinary 
politics for resolution.  Achieving this result is what constitutions are sup-
posed to do.  To be sure, when people argue about what the law means or 
what the Constitution means, it is often very upsetting, because politicians 
often have incentives to make specious or disingenuous claims to justify 
their actions.  But as long as the courts are open and are obeyed, this by it-
self does not produce a constitutional crisis. 
Crisis is not the same thing as injustice.  There are a lot of unjust 
things that happen in a constitutional system without precipitating a consti-
tutional crisis.  Constitutions make politics possible, and politics is often 
unjust.  You can tell if you are in a constitutional crisis when politicians 
stop saying that they will comply with the law, with judicial orders, or with 
the Constitution.  Or you can tell that you are in a constitutional crisis when 
there is widespread civil unrest or rebellion.  Until that happens, you are not 
in a constitutional crisis, and for that, at least, you can be grateful. 
IV.  ARE WE EXPERIENCING CONSTITUTIONAL ROT? 
Although America is not currently in the middle of a constitutional cri-
sis, the country is experiencing constitutional rot, and people have been 
employing the language of constitutional crisis to describe it.  This problem, 
I think, is what Griffin meant when he suggested that we are in a “slow mo-
tion” constitutional crisis caused by lack of public trust in government.41 
Many Americans no longer trust government to act in the public inter-
est, and many politicians act in ways that encourage their lack of trust.42  
We have also experienced severe political polarization, unwise policies 
have exacerbated economic inequality, and American politicians have pro-
duced a series of policy disasters—including, most recently, the global fi-
                                                          
 40.  Levinson & Balkin, supra note 3, at 722–23 (noting that American presidents have never 
asserted prerogative powers to act outside the Constitution; instead they offer controversial inter-
pretations that justify their actions). 
 41.  See supra note 37. 
 42.  See PEW RES. CTR., PUBLIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENT: 1958–2017 (May 3, 2017), 
http://www.people-press.org/2017/05/03/public-trust-in-government-1958-2017/ (“Public trust in 
the government remains near historic lows.”). 
 158 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:147 
 
nancial crisis of 2008.  Thus, each of what I have called the “four horse-
men” of constitutional rot43 have been on the march for some time. 
President Trump has only made matters worse; he has violated many 
preexisting political norms and governed through strategies of exacerbating 
division and polarization.44  The Congressional wing of his party has cast 
aside customary legislative practices as it tries to push through major legis-
lation on health care and taxation with only Republican votes.45  Trump’s 
Administration has generated repeated accusations of corruption and con-
flict of interest,46 and Trump himself seems to regard political office as a 
device for enriching himself and his family.47  When people in power no 
longer hesitate to use their power to enrich themselves, and when norms of 
                                                          
 43.  Balkin, supra note 20, at 22. 
 44.  Id. at 28–29 (describing Trump’s strategy of deliberate polarization and division in order 
to maintain the loyalty of his supporters); Peter Baker, A Divider, Not a Uniter, Trump Widens the 
Breach, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/24/us/politics/trump-
divisiveness.html (“Relentlessly pugnacious, energized by a fight, unwilling to let any slight go 
unanswered, Mr. Trump has made himself America’s apostle of anger, its deacon of divisive-
ness.”); Cathleen Decker, Back into the Trump Vortex America Goes, Where the President Fuels a 
Divisive Debate, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-
strategy-20170926-story.html (“America once again finds itself . . . pulled into the vortex of parti-
sanship as a master publicist plays notes of division and dispute.”). 
 45.  Congressional attempts to repeal and replace Obamacare are exemplary.  See, e.g., Seung 
Min Kim, Frustrated Republicans Try to Rewrite Congress’ Rules, POLITICO (May 22, 2017), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/05/22/republicans-rewrite-congress-rules-agenda-238336 
(“Long-standing norms are being swept aside in the GOP’s haste to enact its agenda.”); Elise Vie-
beck, Seven Ways the Latest Republican Health-Care Effort Is Impulsive and Chaotic, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/seven-ways-the-latest-
republican-health-care-effort-is-impulsive-and-chaotic/2017/09/24/4451aaf4-9fa1-11e7-8ea1-
ed975285475e_story.html (describing how Congress has abandoned traditional legislative practic-
es to pass health care reform). 
 46.  Patrick Radden Keefe, Carl Icahn’s Failed Raid on Washington, NEW YORKER (Aug. 28, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/28/carl-icahns-failed-raid-on-washington 
(“Conflicts of interest have been a defining trait of the Trump Administration.”); Citizens for Re-
sponsibility & Ethics in Washington, Trump Inc: A Chronicle Of Presidential Conflicts, 
https://www.citizensforethics.org/trump-timeline/ (cataloguing presidential conflicts of interest); 
Eric Lipton, Ben Protess & Andrew W. Lehren, With Trump Appointees, a Raft of Potential Con-
flicts and ‘No Transparency’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/us/politics/trump-appointees-potential-conflicts.html  (de-
scribing the Trump Administration’s ethics problems). 
 47.  How Donald Trump Is Monetising His Presidency, ECONOMIST (July 20, 2017),  
https://www.economist.com/news/business/21725303-six-months-mr-trumps-conflicts-interest-
look-even-worse-how-donald-trump-monetising (“Mr Trump already appears to be monetising the 
presidency.”); Kate Brannen, Trump Family’s Endless Conflicts of Interest: Chapter and Verse, 
NEWSWEEK (July 3, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trump-familys-endless-conflicts-interest-
chapter-and-verse-631216 (offering a list of a examples “of the vast number of issues that require 
oversight and scrutiny during this presidency.”); Jeremy Venook, Trump’s Interests vs. America’s, 
Dubai Edition, ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/08/donald-trump-conflicts-of-
interests/508382/  (offering “an attempt to catalogue the more clear-cut examples of conflicts of 
interest that have emerged so far”). 
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fair political competition are pushed aside, the viability of our democratic 
constitutional system is threatened. 
The real concern about James Comey’s firing as FBI Director is best 
understood in terms of constitutional rot.  The FBI director serves for a ten-
year term that is designed to span across presidential terms in office.  The 
goal is to insulate the head of the nation’s investigative service from politi-
cal pressure by politicians—and especially the President, who always re-
tains the power to remove the director.  Thus, the technical legal rule that 
the President can fire the director is accompanied by a more amorphous 
democratic norm; namely, the norm that the President should hesitate to 
remove a director except for very good reasons, and that the President 
should not remove a director in circumstances in which it might appear that 
the President is pressuring the FBI to compromise its investigative authority 
for political reasons. 
The Comey firing violates these democratic norms.  The circumstances 
of the firing, as well as Trump’s own shifting explanations for it, suggest 
that Trump acted out of corrupt motives.  The concern is that Trump fired 
Comey because Trump sought to hinder ongoing investigations into con-
nections between the 2016 Trump presidential campaign and the Russian 
government,48 or between criminal enterprises (like money laundering) in-
volving Russian oligarchs and Trump’s businesses.49  Democratic norms 
exist to prevent even the appearance of political corruption.  The worry is 
that Trump violated democratic norms in circumstances that scream conflict 
of interest and create the appearance of corrupt motivations—that Trump 
used his powers as President to obstruct an ongoing criminal investigation.  
If one could prove Trump’s intent to obstruct the FBI’s investigations, this 
would constitute a violation of federal obstruction of justice laws, and very 
likely would constitute an impeachable offense to boot.50 
                                                          
 48.  President Trump explained in a May 11, 2017, interview with Lester Holt of NBC News 
that he was determined to fire Comey even before receiving advice from Attorney General Jeffrey 
Sessions and Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein because he was angry with Comey’s con-
tinued investigative focus on Russia.  James Griffiths, Trump Says He Considered ‘This Russia 
Thing’ Before Firing FBI Director Comey, CNN (May 12, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/12/politics/trump-comey-russia-thing/ (“And in fact when I decided 
to just do it, I said to myself, I said ‘you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a 
made-up story.’”).  Immediately after the firing, however, the White House’s official explanation 
had been that Trump acted on the advice of Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein, “who sharply 
criticized the handling of the investigation into Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server as 
secretary of state.”  Id. 
 49.  See Matthew Rosenberg & Matt Apuzzo, Days Before Firing, Comey Asked for More 
Resources for Russia Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/politics/comey-russia-investigation-fbi.html?_r=0 (not-
ing a recent shift in the Senate investigation to focus on illegal money-laundering operations). 
 50.  See, e.g., David G. Savage, Trump’s Statements Linking Russia Investigation to Comey 
Firing Could Lead to Legal Problems, L.A. TIMES (May 12, 2017), 
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Constitutional rot does not occur all at once; it is a gradual process.  
The constitutional system in the United States may well be able to survive 
even Donald Trump’s misadventures.  But Trump’s demagogic rise to pow-
er, his conduct of the presidency, and the inability (or unwillingness) of 
members of Congress to stop him, are signs that all is not well in American 
constitutional democracy.  To paraphrase Shakespeare, something is rotten 
in the state of America.  The limbs of the great tree of state are decaying.  
At some point, if we put too much weight on our democratic institutions, 
they will snap.  Then we really will be in a constitutional crisis. 
The language of constitutional rot is a better way to understand peo-
ple’s recurrent use of “constitutional crisis” in describing the Trump Ad-
ministration.  There is currently no actual constitutional crisis in the United 
States.  But if constitutional rot continues, we are living on borrowed time. 
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